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The Regulatory Challenges of

Cross-Bordet
Banking in an Eta of Post Banking Consolidation

inNigeria.
Samuel A. Oni'

I.

Inttoduction
is no gainsaying that banks play a cenual role in any economy.

In simple terms,

ftlhere
*", accept deposits and provide credit to people and businesses. They also
I
-I- provide channels for the efficient transfer of finds; act as trustees and tender
custodian services to the public. Through their intetmediation function, they provide

platform for the implementation

of

a

monetaly policy. This oils the machinety of

development.

Given the critical roles played by the banks and other financial institutions in economic
development, the importance

of

banks' soundness and more broadly, financial sector

for good economic performance cannot be over-emphasised. One of the
challenges of supetvision, therefore, is to ensure that banking and financial systems,
domestic and international, are and indeed, safe and remain sound. Given the
soundness

macroeconomic fallout and othet negative extetnalities

of

banking system problems,

efforts to keep national and international fnancial systems safe and sound are very much
part of the mandate of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).

II.

Banking Reforms in Nigeria.

of the Nigerian banking industry. They have been introduced
to challenges posed by developments within the economy or those from

Reforms have been a feature
either in response

outside the economy such

as the

imminence of systemic distress, deregulation,liberalization

and globalization. Thus, the 2004 banking sector reforms were part

of

the broaderon-going

national economic reforms christened National Economic Empowerment and
Development Strategy QTIEEDS) designed to rethze Nigeria's vision

of

becoming the

' Mr Samuel A. Oni is the Director, Banking Supervision Depatmrenq Central Bank of Nigeda. The views expressed
in this paper are thosc of the authot and do not necessatily reprcsent the views of dre CBN ot its policies
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largest African economy and a key player in wodd economy by the end

of

December 2009

the

frst half of

the 21"' centuty.

The reforms intended to be a survival strategy to stem t}re imminent distress in t}te sector
and a growth and development strategy to ensure the soundness, stability, efficiency and
reliability of the sector

It should

be recalled that the Nigetia banking reforms which focused on consolidation and

recapitalization was prompted by some structural and operational weaknesses, wh.ich
included: low capital base; a large number

of

small banks with relatively few bmnches; the

of a few banks; poot rating of a number of banks; weak corporate governance;
insolvency; over-dependence on public sector deposits, and foreign exchange tading;
neglect of small and medium scale savets; and lack of capacity to support the real sector of
dominance

the economy.

Thus handicapped, the Nigerian banking industry as at endJune 2004 was not in

a

position

to meet the nation's ideal of a srong, competitive and reliable banking system. It, therefore,
required urgent and fundamental resttucturing and refocusing, which was ptovided by the

reforms in the sector. The reforms tesulted, among othet things, in the inctease in the
minimum the required capital for banks to N25 billion, resulting in bigger, somewhat
stronger and certainly more sophisticated banks.

In the last three or so years, we have seen the emergence of some big cross-border banks
with major activities in several countries. And this financial integration is accelerating This
development, in my opinion, is positive for the economy.

product development across countries.
economies

of

scale and scope. The spread

levels in different parts

the subject

It

of

It

stimulates competition and

also means that the banks can profit ftom

of

cross-border banking has reached different

of the wodd. As the integration of financial markets picks up speed,

supervision and crisis management

of

internationally active banks have

gained importance and has presented the Nigerian regulatots
regulatory challenges, which this paper aims to discuss.

with serious cross-border
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Cross-BorderSupervisionChallenges.

Ctoss-borderlnstability

Cross-border banking instability could spread t}rough some "contagion links" such as
those transmitted thtough the on-going global financial ctisis. Such crisis could take root

in

an international bank with a btanch structure (one legal entity headquartered in a home

country) versus a subsidiary structure (different legal entities in most countdes). For
example, problems
activity.

in a patent bank in one country might lead to curbs on its lending

In a branch structure, these curbs might be system-wide, causing the problem to

spread to other countries, whereas with a subsidiary structure, the lending curbs would be

chiefly confined to the parent, reducing potential contagion.

lll.2

Supervisionactoss-botders,

The basic desire to ensure cross-border financial stability and attain the level playing field
between countries led to the fust effort to coordinate supervision, in line with the Basel

Accord

of

1975. While the accord was an important step

I

in terms of coordination and

communication, persistent gaps fueled additional agreements through the years, eventually
Ieading to today's Basel

II

principles. There has been significant convergence in the core

principles and the challenge is to hammer out and orgarize actual rules that would permeate
regional borders. The overall challenge that cross-border supetvision and regulation face is
the difficulty in information sharing, particulatly
a

if

a

bank concentrates certain functions in

certain country.

III.3

GovernmentSafetyNets.

A key issue in cross-border banking regulation has to do with who takes responsibility when
transnational banks run into trouble. What country or entity should provide liquidity in
time

of crisis in other words, who should function

as a

a

lender-ofJast resort (LOLR)? Also,

where can depositors turn to szhen international banks fail? !71ri1e this is still an issue in the

sub-region,

in Europe, the basic operational framework of monetary policy

already

provides an effective automatic LOLR structure.

Issues

of cross-border deposit insurance could

an international bank runs

pose a serious challenge to regulation. \When

into touble, the patchwork of national insolvency laws is iil-

T;i6.**
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equipped to restructure the institution and continue critical pay,rnents in a reasonable time

frame. Various deposit insurance programmes differ in the qpes
covered, maximum limits

of

of

accounts that are

coverage, funding mechanisms, government guarantees and

payment speed. Perhaps most importandy, the flexibility of the laws varies, meaning that
regulators often by-pass the system during a crisis and bail out the institution with

government funds. This creates issues

of

moral hazatd with potentially significant

economic costs.

III.4

InsolvencyResolution.

Although the causes of cross-border banking and financial crises are not yet fully known,

the negative effects are clear. Liquidity problems, setdement and clearing issues, and
disruptions to hedge conracts are only a few of the difficulties that could tesult from these
situations. Focusing on bankruptcy laws for example, the longer the bankruptcy process, the
longer the depositors have to wait for access to funds, and potentially the deeper the crisis.

This state of affaits is compounded in cross-border scenados in which bankruptcy laws
diffet between countries. The issue of lack6f coherence in bank insolvency regimes across
the borders is, therefore,

a

major source of challenge for regulation.

III.5
'We

Eatlylntervention.
are advocates of "prompt corrective action"@CA),

a system adopted

in the U.S. that is

designed to minimize deposit insurance losses by mandating eady supervisory intervention

at troubled banks. Lawmakets and regulators must accept a few key concepts in order for

PCA to be effective. For one, limits must be placed on supervisors' disctetion; unless they

ate requited to act eady supervisors may wait out problems and hope they correct
themselves. Also,

it must be accepted that banks will be closed even at positive levels of

regulatory capital. Some institutional requirements for effective PCA include: supervisory
independence, but with accountability; adequate supervisory powets, such as the ability to

withdraw licenses; sound resolution procedures that inspire confidence; and reasonable,
timely financial information. With these measures in place, PCA can help minimize the
economic and financial costs of the bank insolvency. Howevet, most countrie s in t}te subregion have

a

long way to go to meet the conditions necessary for an effective PCA strategy

domestically, let alone in cross-border situations.
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CrisisPtevention.

The curtent ctoss-botder supervisory framework multinational banks with national
harmonization with persistent national diffetences wouid likely run into trouble in a crisis.

In order to prevent contagiofl, there might have to be

of laws and regulations. Unfortunately, while the desite

a significandy greater

exists, the political

harmonization

will to putsue this

goal is rather limited.

III.7 National

Interests.

Another challenge is that decisions and actions by national authorities are likely to have
considerable implications for the financial sability in foreign economies. This is, of coutse,
particu.lady true in cases whete foreign operations are run through btanches, meaning that
they are subject to foreign supervision.

III.8

e-Banking

The popularity

of

accessing banking services through the internet and mobile phones is

rising. The key issue for bariking supervisors is how to ensure effective supervision

of

operations both in their own matket ( as host supervisot) when setvices ate ptovided ftom
abroad, and in foreign markets when

a

bank is licensed in the home jurisdiction. Both issues

are not new, given the continuously rising

impotance of cross-bordet ttansactions, but can

take on even more significance in the case

of

e-banking.

A

new,

or considerably more

pronounced challenge with which supervisors are faced, arises from teJiance on technology
for the delivery of e-banking services and ptoducts.

III.9

CorporateGovernance

The failute of colporate governance has been identified as one of the major teasons for
bank failures in Nigeria. It is a fundamental cause of banking problems and manifests in

poor management and more broadly, weak internal governance by owners and managers.
These weaknesses are frequendy brought to light by adverse macroeconomic developments

which have negative impact on all banks, but tefld to affect poody managed ones most
heavily. Many governments, Nigeria inclusive, are concerned about protecting the central

role of the banking system and guarding against the negative externalities associated with
bank failures, especially when such failures are widespread.
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The CBN, mindful of the havoc that poor governa.nce has brought on the bankiflg system
ovef the years, introduced various tlpes

of

safeguards to foster proper internal governance,

compensate for failure in market discipline, and help protect the banking system in the event

of

adverse macroeconomic shocks. It was in this regard that it issued a Code

Governance to the banking industry in March 2006, the implementation
closely monitored. Also, the entire framework

of

of Corpomte

of which

is being

prudential regulation and supervisory

practices is designed to ensure that sound corporate governance practices are the building
blocks upon which our banks and othet financial institutions are run.

III.10 Supervision of Financial Conglomerates
It is my belief that the reforms that have been embarked upon in the Nigerian banking
indusry are well documented in the literature and do not need tecounting for an audience of
this nature. Suffice to say, however, that the Nigeria banking reforms which centred on

consolidation and recapitalization resulted

in the increase in

banks' capital and

concomitant increase in size and complexity of operations. The increasing complexity
the otganizational structures that are being supervised, that is, conglomerates that deal

all tlpes

of fiaancial

a

of

with

and non-financial operations often not just within ofle country, but

around the globe, is one of the primary challenges facing supervision today. Meetiflg this

wiil require enormous efforts to harmonize tegulations and ptactices among
supervisors of different categories of financial institutions, both nationally and

challenge

internationally. Many such effons are already underway, and some headway had been made.

For instance, the reinvigoration

of the Financial Services Regulation

Co-ordination

Committee (FSRCC), an umbrella body for all financial services regulatory agencies in the
countty, the signing of Memorandum of Understanding (NlOUs) with some iurisdictions,
adoption of consolidated supervision and the planned adoption of International Financial
Repotting Standards (FRS) by Decembet 31, 2070 are efforts being made by the CBN to
address this challenge.

A closely related subject is the legal framework under wh.ich these institutions will operate
and thrive. The regulation

of

financial conglomerates will requite a body

covering the activities of business gtoups that act in different sector

of

of

local Iaws

the financial system

which may include banking, securities and pensions. In this regard, the review

of

the
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governing laws, which ate not elaborate enough and limit the conduct of comPrehensive and
consolidated supervision

of

the entities

as

well as the groups, is a challenge that is yet to be

surmounted.

III.11 CapacityBuilding
For bank supervisors to effectively caffy out theit responsibilities and delivet on their

with the growing complexities of banking
The way to achieve this is through training and reraining of supetvisory staff. The

mandate, they must
activities.

rapid rate

of

of

necessity keep pace

innovation in the global financial system has challenged the capacity of

regulators to cope with developments in the system the world-over. In Nigeria, there are two
major institutes that are tesponsible for the provision of training at all levels for the banking

industq,. The fust is the Chartered Institute
charged with the regulation

of

of

Bankers

banking education

of

Nigeria, which is statutorily

in the country and the Financial

Institutions Training Centre, which provides mainly highJevel training for the indusry in
the form

of short

courses.

ITAIFEM has also made some rematkable impact in this

The capacity of these institutions to adequately cope with the requirement

of

area.

the industty is

limited inviewof the developments in the industty post consolidation. The issue of capacity
building should also involve the development of the technical and ptofessional skills of not
onJy the supervisors, but the operators as well.

III.12 Disclosure
Distinguished ladies and gendemen, you

wi[

agree with me that the current disclosure

requitements do not provide adequate information to allow market participants access

of information on risk exposures, risk assessment processes, capital, and the capital
adequacy of banks. Banks need to make disclosutes that reflect their risk profile as market
dynamics change because of theit responsibilities to vadous matket stakeholderq The
pieces

absence

of

such disclosure tequirements has made itpossible for banks to exhibit significant

discretion on the information they choose to disclose, thereby making it difficult fot market
participants to analyze their actual risk profiles. This attempt on the patt of banks, which
some,

banks.

if

not all cases, is deliberate, makes it difficult to assess and compare the risk profile

h
of

I

l0
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Market paticipants are also slow to respond to pieces of available information ofl banks,
possibly because they do not understand the information or they fail to appropriately
decipher it. In essence, market response to appropriately rev/ard or punish banks that fail to
identi$, and monitor their risk profiles has not been encouraging. The CBN, mindlirl of this
lapse, has adopted the International Financial Repotting Standard with banks expected to

fully comply by December 2010. Also, the planned implementation of the fiird Pillar of
Basel

II Accord would provide a platfotm

through which market paticipaflts can assess

banks' risk and performance. Thus, the recent eflgagement

of

consultants by the CBN to

prepare a comprehensive framework on "Additional Disclosure" by banks in Nigeria is
timely and should be seen

III.13
Lack

of

as

awelcome development.

Data Integrity
accurate data undermines not only internal governance in banks, but also market

discipline and official oversight. Incteasing the availabiJity

of

reliable information is

a

challenge that supervision has sttuggled to surmount in Nigeria. This problem is, however,

not localized as it exists even in the international financial arena. It is generally agreed that
increasing the availability

of

reliable information and data will require a

ruly

massive

international effort to improve accounting and auditing standards and especially to get
common rules and practices on loan classification and provisioning. In Nigeda, efforts such
as the

inftoduction of the electronic Financial Analysis System,(e-FASS),

a

platfotm for an

online rendition of statutory returns to the CBN by banks and other financial institutions,

the resident examiners programme, the adoption

of

common accounting year end by

December 31, 2009 and the deadline of December 31,2010 set for the adoption of IFRS by

Nigerianbanks,

as

eadier mentioned, ate intended to address this challenge.

III.14 Implementation of Basel II
As the risks faced by internationally active banks (some Nigerian banks are now active in
several countries), become complex, the 1988 Basel

risks faced by these banks. The failure

Basel

I to appropriately capture and measure t}re

II by the Bank for Internationa.l Setdement @IS).
Basel II aims at imptoving flexibility and risk sensitivity in capital adequacy measurement
with the objective of promoting safety and soundness, competitive equality, and a
risks led to the introduction

of

of

I became inadequate in measuring the

Basel
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comprehensive approach to addressing risk. Although, the CBN has made some efforts at

implementing the Accord by holding several awareness seminars, wotkshops and ttaining

programmes

for both its staff and the industry in

general, the framework for

implementation, which was developed in 2005 still remained unimplemented.

The implementation

of

the Basel

II would

assist

banls in the development of efficient and

comprehensive risk management systems and risk identification, monitoring reporting to
banks management and internal control system. The issue

of

data gathering and technical

expettise has, however, remained a challenge for supervisors and ptactitioners alike to
surmount. Added to this is the problem of absence of competent rating agencies whose role
in this process is critical.

III.15 Managing the Aftetmath of the Global Financial Crisis
of my presentation, some of the challenges that we face as
supervisors today are a consequence of recent developments in the financial system, both
locally and internationally. The causes of the global financial crisis that ravaged most, if not
all, economies of the wodd from 2008 are well documented and do not need to be
recounted to a distinguished audience of this nature. However, it would be inappropriate fot
me to end this presentation without a mention of this issue especially in the light of recent
As mentioned at the beginning

happenings in outdomestic financial system.

The effects

of

the globhl financial crisis, which led to the collapse

of many banks and other

financial institutions in the vrorld and even rendered an entire nation banl<rupt are still being

felt today. In Nigeria, the banking system appeared to have weathered the storm due to
number

of

factors, such as, the partial integration

of our financial system into

a

the

International Financial System, the relatively simple nature of financial products znd the

of Nigerian banks. Howeveq while the system in general
absorbed and survived the effects of the crisis, the effects were mote stenuous o11 some
banks than others. Some banks, mainly due to huge concentrations in their exposwe to
strong caPiralization and liquidity

certain sectors (Capital Market and Oil and Gas being the prominent ones), and due to

a

general weakness in risk management and corporate governance, continued to display signs

of

failure. An audit

of

the banks was, therefore, carried out to ascertah the
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